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ARTICLES
Letting Go of the Eleventh Amendment
GENE

I.

R. Snt~vE*

THE SETTING

In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,' the Supreme Court must decide
whether a private party can claim damages against a state in federal
superfund litigation.2 The case involves some of the most debated and
intellectually compromised doctrine under the Constitution, that interpreting
the eleventh amendment. 3 The issues that the parties have framed in Union
Gas are (1) whether the eleventh amendment ever protects an unconsenting
state from federal suit by its own citizens; (2) if so, whether Congress has
authority under the commerce clause of article I to suspend the amendment;
(3) if so, whether Congress did that in the Superfund Act.
Most significant of the three, the first issue is certain to revive longstanding conflict on the Court over adherence to eleventh amendment precedent

* Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School of
Law at Bloomington. The author wishes to express his appreciation to the Law School and
Indiana University for a research grant supporting publication of this paper; to professors
Daniel Conkle, Stephen Conrad, Robert Heidt, Joseph Hoffmann, William Marshall, Peter
Raven-Hansen, Lauren Robel, and David Skover for their suggestions; and to Jeff Pankratz,
Class of 1990, for his research assistance.
1. United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom.
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988).
2. Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability (CERCLA or Superfund) Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 33 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C. and in 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675), the
United States sued Union Gas for cleanup costs. Union Gas Company filed a third-party claim
for damages against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania argued unsuccessfully
before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that the eleventh amendment barred Union's claim.
The United States Supreme Court granted Pennsylvania's petition for certiorari. See generally
Shreve, State Immunity from FederalSuit- When Can CongressAlter the Balance?, 3 A.B.A.
PrEvmw U.S. Sup. CT. CASEs 67 (1988).
3. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, A muC AN CONs
rIoNAL LAw 173 (2d ed. 1987) (The Court's
decisions are marked by "resort to legal fictions" reached through "complex and often
counterintuitive interpretations of the eleventh amendment that have made that amendment
far more controversial than its language would, on its face, suggest."); Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. Ray. 1889,
1891 (1983) (The same are "little more than a hodgepodge of confusing and intellectually
indefensible judge-made law.").
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barring citizen suits. Whether states should be immune to such suits has
been much debated in the literature.4 Rather than add to that debate, this
paper takes a different course. My thesis is that the quality of the state
immunitys dialogue suffers from the tendency of both sides to overstate the
significance of the eleventh amendment. I will suggest why it may be equally
6
wrong either to claim general sanctuary for states in the eleventh amendment
or to suggest that, when the eleventh amendment does not protect states
from federal suit, they enjoy no protection under the Constitution. 7 From
this perspective, Union Gas creates an opportunity in danger of being
overlooked: to improve the quality of state immunity law by letting go of
the eleventh amendment.
The eleventh amendment owes its existence to Chisholm v. Georgia.' The
Supreme Court applied the federal judicial power under article III 9 of the

4. See, e.g., Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. CoLO. L. REv. 139
(1977); Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment
Survived the Death of tire Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, 74 GEo. L.J. 363 (1985); Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and Federal Court Power:
The Eleventh Amendment after Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HAsTiNrs CoNsr. L.Q. 643 (1985);
Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Case of the White Knight's Green
Whiskers, 5 Hous. L. REv. 1 (1967); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign
Immunity Doctrines: CongressionalImposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REv.
1203 (1978); Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, supra note 3; Jackson, The Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988);
Liberman, State Sovereign Immunity in Suits to Enforce FederalRights, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q.
195; Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HALv. L.
REv. 61 (1984); Thornton, The Eleventh Amendment: An Endangered Species, 55 IND. L.J.
293 (1980).
5. The term "sovereign immunity" is often used to describe law setting the degree to
which states are to be exposed to federal suit. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984); Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YAIE L.J.
1425, 1467 (1987). Yet the idea of state sovereign immunity in federal court seems a little
confusing in this context; the only authority sovereign in the sense of limiting the extent to
which it may be sued in its own courts is the United States. On sovereign immunity enjoyed
by the United States, see generally Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1, 29-39 (1963); Webster, Beyond Federal Sovereign Immunity:
5 U.S.C. § 702 Spells Relief, 49 Omo ST. L.J. 725 (1988); Developments in the LawRemedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HAgv. L. REv. 827 (1957). None of
this is to say, of course, that states should not be entitled to a measure of immunity to federal
suit secured by the Constitution. See infra Conclusion.
6. See infra notes 33-72 and accompanying text.

7. See infra CONCLUSION.
8. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). On the case and its repercussions, see J. GOEBEL, HISTORY
OF THE Su, ME COURT OF THE UITm STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINos TO 1801 72536 (1971); C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SovEEiNni ImmurU
46-74 (1972); J.
ORTH, THE JUDICIAL. POWER OF TEE UNITED STATEs-THE ELEvENTH AmNDmENT IN AmERICAN
HISTORY 12-29 (1987); 1 C. WARREN, THE SuFRamE COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 93-102
(1937); Amar, supra note 5, at 1467-75; Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1920-39; Mathis, Chisholm
v. Georgia: Background and Settlement, 54 J. Am. HIsT. 19 (1967).
9. Article III establishes but does not entirely define "[the judicial Power of the United
States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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Constitution to adjudicate a damage action by a South Carolinian against
the State of Georgia. States might enjoy sovereign immunity in their own
courts but had to yield to federal judicial power. This conclusion was not
obvious from the text of the Constitution or the ratification debates.10 Quite
unpopular, Chisholm was squarely overruled by the eleventh amendment
five years later." The amendment became part of the constitutional law of
3
2
federal subject matter jurisdiction for article III courts.1
Let us consider the state immunity controversy into which the eleventh
amendment has been drawn.

10. Previously, "nationalists such as James Madison, John Marshall, and Alexander
Hamilton publicly denied that the clause would be interpreted in that manner." J. Scm mHAUSER, THE Su PEmE COURT AS FnNAL ARHTER iN FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS: 1789-1957 19
(1958). However, not all of the figures prominent in the ratification debates subscribed to this
view of article III. Note, Interperting the Ratifiers' Intent: The Burger Court's Eleventh
Amendment JurisprudenceReconsidered in the Light of Erie Railroad v. Thompkins, 66 WASH.
U.L.Q. 135, 144-49 (1988).
11. The amendment was presented in the Senate within two days of the decision. J.
SCM M HAUsER, supra note 10, at 20. Initiatives in the House of Representatives were also
prompt. Fletcher, supra note 4 at 1058-59. Some three weeks later both houses had proposed
the amendment. J. ORTH, supra note 8, at 20. "[L]ess than a year after its proposal, the
requisite number of state legislatures had acted favorably." Id. "Certification of action by
the ratifying states was extremely erratic, however, and for this reason the amendment was
not immediately recognized as part of the Constitution." C. JAcoBS, supra note 8, at 67.
Denying federal judicial power for suits "against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State," the amendment reflects the feature in Chisholm of suit against Georgia by a
South Carolinian. Why the amendment imposes the same disability on "Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State" is less clear. It may reflect the impression, discussed in Orth, The
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 1798-1908, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 423, 427, that
Chisholm was brought by a British subject.
12. For summaries of the development of eleventh amendment law, see J. NOWACK, R.
ROTUNDA

& J. YOUNG, CONsrruToNAL

LAW

46-55 (1986); L. TamE, supra note 3, at 173-95.

13. Article III creates and, by implication, limits federal judicial power. The eleventh
amendment only limits it. In certain respects, however, the limitations added by the amendment
are less rigid than the kind imposed by article III.
Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction lacking under article III through waiver
or consent, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943), but a defendant state can
waive objection or consent to federal jurisdiction in a suit otherwise barred by the eleventh
amendment, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2945
(1987) (plurality opinion).
Similarly, Congress may not create jurisdiction for article III courts beyond the limits set
in the article. E.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983); Hodgson v.
Bowerback, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809) (Congress cannot confer jurisdiction on courts it
creates under article III of a kind not described in the article.); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(I Cranch) 137 (1803) (Congress cannot enlarge the original (viz. nonappellate) jurisdiction
conferred on the Supreme Court by article III.). But Congress may deny states eleventh
amendment protection, so long as Congress makes its intent to do so "unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
Congress can suspend the eleventh amendment when it acts under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Whether it has the same power when
legislating under article I is an open question, Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2948 n.8, one the Supreme
Court could resolve in ttie pending Union Gas case. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying
text.
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FEDERAL RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Defining federal subject matter jurisdiction is a classical political exercise.
This is true whether that law determines the relationship of the federal
judiciary to other branches of the United States government' 4 or (as by the
5
eleventh amendment) allocates cases between state and federal trial courts.
To comprehend the state immunity controversy, however, it is necessary to
consider the politics of federal jurisdiction in a second sense-as an extension
of the politics of federal substantive law.
Federal substantive law politicizes federal question jurisdiction because of
the assumption that federal judges are inclined to give wider application

than state judges to the same federal substantive law.1 6 That is, federal

courts often are thought to give broader definition to federal rights and to

7
provide earlier opportunities for their vindication.
The Constitution itself does not invite this assumption. State and federal
judges are equally bound under the supremacy clause to disregard state law
that cannot be reconciled with federal law.'" Nothing in the Constitution
requires federal judges to give greater reach to federal substantive law.
Some argue that state judges actually are as willing as federal judges to
apply federal law, or that at least we should assume this is true absent

convincing proof to the contrary.

9

14. Thus, the Supreme Court limits interference by the federal judiciary with the operation
of the executive and legislative branches. See, e.g., Henkin, Is There a "Political Question"
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Redish, JudicialReview and the "PoliticalQuestion, " 79
Nw. U.L. Rav. 1031 (1984).
15. See, e.g., Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984).
16. The assumption is widespread. See, e.g., M. REDIsH, FEDERAL JUIuDicON: TrNsiols
IN Tim ALLOCATON OF JUDIcIAL POWER 2 (1980); Kanowitz, Deciding Federal Law Issues in
Civil Proceedings: State Versus Federal Trial Courts, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 141 (1976);
Maroney, Averting the Flood: Henry J. Friendly and the Jurisdictionof the FederalCourtsPart I, 27 SYacusE L. REv. 1071 (1976); Marvell, The Rationales of Federal Question
Jurisdiction: An Empirical Examination of Students' Rights Litigation, 1984 Wis. L. REv.
1315; Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HAir. L. REv. 1105 (1977); Comment, Protecting
Fundamental Rights in State Courts: Fitting a State Peg to a FederalHole, 12 HAv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 63 (1977); Hellman, Book Review, 39 STAN. L. Ray. 297, 313-15 (1986).
17. Particularly with respect to preventative relief. See Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies:
A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 665
(1987).
18. The supremacy clause states that the Constitution and all other, duly created federal
law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI.

19. See Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. Rav. 1352 (1970);
Miner, The Tensions of a Dual Court System and Some Prescriptionsfor Relief, 51 ALB. L.
REv. 151 (1987); Solimine & Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federaland State Courts:
An EmpiricalAnalysis of JudicialParity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213 (1983); Note, Limiting
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However, one need not question the good faith or diligence of state
judges to conclude that they are unlikely overall to read as much into
federal substantive law. Since they work with their state law more than
federal judges do, it would be natural for them to give it more life and
federal law correspondingly less. 2 Indeed, that federal courts might provide
a more receptive climate for federal substantive law is a reality acknowledged
21
by federal question jurisdiction.

Federal substantive law always leaves some better off than they would be
under only state law.22 In civil litigation, it now seems generally to favor

the Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 IARv. L. REV. 1486 (1969).
In addition, it has been suggested that state courts are more willing to vindicate civil rights
based on state constitutional law. See Rosenfeld, The Place of State Courts in the Era of
Younger v. Harris, 59 B.U.L. REv. 597, 650-51 (1979). See generally The Emergence of State
Constitutional Law, 63 Tax. L. REv. 959 (1985); Pollock, State Constitutions As Separate
Sources of FundamentalRights, 35 RUTGERs L. REV. 707 (1983). It has even been suggested
that state courts are at times more willing to vindicate civil rights based on federal law, see
Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A ProceduralReview, 38 U. MIAWM L.
REy. 381 (1984), a notion made more plausible by the fact that now more than 48% of sitting
federal judges are Reagan appointees. Collins & Skover, The Future of Legal Scholarship, 87
MICH. L. REV. 189, 191 (1988). But see Smith v. Michigan Dep't of Pub. Health, 428 Mich.
540, 410 N.W.2d 749 (1987), cert. granted sub nom. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,
108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988). The Michigan Supreme Court read 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be no more
enforceable than it would have been in federal court.
Two recent articles survey and critique the seemingly endless debate whether parity exists
between state and lower federal courts. See Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a
Role for the FederalJudiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988); Wells, Is Disparitya Problem?,
22 GA. L. REV. 283 (1988).
20. For elaboration of this point, see Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest,
51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 382, 418 (1983). If state judges read federal law less broadly than
federal judges, they are not a priori in violation of the supremacy clause. The duty imposed
by the supremacy clause to enforce federal law is not the duty to give it the broadest possible
reading, only a duty to give it a reasonable reading and one in keeping with controlling
precedent. The only federal decisions on the meaning of federal law which bind state courts
are those of the United States Supreme Court. See Shapiro, State Courts and Federal
DeclaratoryJudgments, 74 Nw. U.L. RaV. 759 (1979); Note, Authority in State Courts of
Lower Federal Court Decisions on National Law, 48 CoLum. L. REv. 943 (1948).
21. Since errors can favor either side, the possibility that state judges might misunderstand
federal law more frequently than federal judges may not suggest that federal claimants are on
the whole worse off in state court. However, "[w]here the difficulty is not misunderstanding
of federal law, but lack of sympathy--or even hostility-toward it, there is a marked advantage
in providing an initial federal forum." AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 167 (1969) [hereinafter STUDY]. Original federal question

jurisdiction is important, then, both to enhance uniformity in federal law and to reduce bias
against it. Id. at 168. This is most evident in federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction, see the
analysis and authorities in Shreve, Preclusion and Federal Choice of Law, 64 TEx. L. RV.
1209, 1240 (1986), and in their concurrent jurisdiction to enforce claims under the Constitution,
see STUDY, supra, at 168; cf. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (noting that original
federal question jurisdiction for civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was important in
part because Congress "realized that state officers might, in fact, be antipathetic to the
vindication of those rights; and it believed that these failings extended to the state courts").
22. Of course, not always the same group. The pendulum of political advantage swings
over time. For example, federal law was politically conservative in the late nineteenth century,
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interests supported by the liberal left.23 In particular, federal civil rights
law, usually vindicated through 42 U.S.C. section 1983, has offered special
advantages to minorities, to the disadvantaged, and to individuals who feel
intruded upon by government.2A Typical section 1983 litigation finds persons
so aggrieved suing state or local officials. The left is likely to be solicitous
of the interests of such plaintiffs.Y
On the other side,2 conservatives are likely to sympathize with government
defendants either because they see the benefit to which the plaintiff claims
a right as one which government should have the discretion to withhold,
or because they see the plaintiff's suit as interference with government's

realization of some moral agenda. Moreover, conservatives favor local
autonomy in making and enforcing moral judgments and find interruptions
from without, i.e., from the federal government through its judicial branch,
particularly irritating. 27

favoring monied, corporate interests to a greater extent than state law. This was true of both
the general federal common law created under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), see J.W.
HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAw-THE LAW MAKERS 190 (1950), and federal consti-

tutional law. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 113 (1908), offers an illustration of the latter.
Concluding that the eleventh amendment did not bar suit, the Court held that Minnesota's
statute attempting to set maximum railroad rates violated the due process clause.
23. That is, the near left. This paper does not suggest political attitudes toward jurisdiction
which might be held by those farther left, notably the Critical Legal Studies movement. The
view in some CLS writing which values both individual freedom and local government
autonomy, see, e.g., Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. Rav. 1059 (1980),
would make that exercise difficult. Even to use the terms liberal and conservative in the
manner intended by this paper carries with it the risk of oversimplification. "The belief systems
of Americans are more complex than the liberal-conservative dichotomy acknowledges." Boaz,
Foreward to W. MADDOX & S. Lmnm, BEYOND LmERAL AND CONSERVATrVE-REAsSESSING THE
POLITICAL SPECTRUM ix (1984).
24. See Recent Developments in Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Acts' Litigation, 9 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 463 (1982); Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
HARv. L. REv. 1133 (1977).
25. Most agree that the Warren Court reflected these sentiments. See, e.g., J. ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-75 (1980); D. O'BRunN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 158-60 (1986).
26. For a liberal-conservative distinction similar to the one described in this paper, see A.
Cox, Tim COURT AND Tma CONSTUTION 348 (1987).
27. The Burger Court often exhibited these traits, see Gelfand, The Burger Court and the

New Federalism: Preliminary Reflections on the Roles of Local Government Actors in the
PoliticalDramas of the 1980's, 21 B.C.L. REv. 763 (1980), as does the Rehnquist Court. Cf.
Collins & Skover, supra note 19, at 193 (describing the present Chief Justice and Justices
White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy as a "conservative phalanx"). Modern judicial con-

servatism is complicated, however, by periodic libertarian impulses. See Nowak, Forward:
Evaluating the Work of the New Libertarian Supreme Court, 7 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 263
(1980). Libertarianism might seem close to the left/liberal model because it supports individuals
against government restraint. However, it may be antagonistic to liberal sentiments, putting
"freedom of the individual above values of egalitarianism or fairness." Id. at 284. But see
W. MADDOX & S. LInE, supra note 23, at 14 ("Libertarians explicitly embrace most of the
assumptions of classical liberalism."). In any event, the Court has often been willing to
overlook libertarian arguments in order to advance the conservative agenda summarized in the

text. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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That federal jurisdiction enhances enforcement of federal substantive law

is a point upon which liberals and conservatives might agree while preserving
their ideological differences. 2 They might similarly agree that often liberal
interests are best advanced in federal court and, correspondingly, conservative interests in state court. 29 The eleventh amendment has thus become
a political battleground. 0 The liberal position is to minimize the obstacle
to federal jurisdiction posed by the amendment, and the conservative

position is to use it to block federal court adjudication of as many cases
as possible. Confirming this, the four Justices of the Court regarded to be
most liberal are on record as wishing greatly to reduce the scope of the
eleventh amendment, 31 while conservative members of the Court who have
2
3
spoken on the issue defend current law.

III.

HA.M FROM EXAGGERATING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
ELEVENTH A.MNDhMEfNT

The foregoing discussion suggests why debate about the proper scope of
federal judicial power over states is not likely to end soon. What can and
should end is preoccupation with the eleventh amendment. The amendment
is really too insignificant to provide structure or direction to the debate
between those wishing to protect states and those wishing to expose them

28. Particularly with an explanation of the difference presented earlier that does not impugn
the good faith or intellectual capacity of state judges. See supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
29. As Professor Wells observes:
Although the Court refuses to say so, nearly everyone else would agree that there
are differences in the performance of state and federal courts. As between the
two, state courts are more likely to decide close questions in constitutional cases
in favor of the state, while federal courts will more often decide them in favor
of the individual asserting a constitutional claim.
Wells, supra note 19, at 336. See also Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA.
L. REv. 1141, 1151-64 (1988).
30. "The eleventh amendment lies at the center of the tension between state sovereign
immunity and the desire to have in place mechanisms for the effective vindication of federal
rights." L. TamE, supra note 3, at 173.
31. In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), Justice Stevens joined
dissenters Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall in urging that Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890), be overruled so that citizens could bring federal suit against their own states without
eleventh amendment interference. The group has reiterated its position, dissenting in Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 74-79, 81 (1985) and Welch v. Texas Department of Highways &
Public Transportation, 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2958-70 (1987). See also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 292-95 (1986) (where the four took the same position dissenting in part and concurring
in part). For further discussion of the controversy over Hans, see infra notes 39-45 and
accompanying text.
32. In Welch, the Chief Justice and Justices White and O'Connor joined Justice Powell
in defending Hans.
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to federal suit. To pretend otherwise works mischief on state immunity law

in at least two ways.
First, while each side has much to contribute in a dialogue determining
when state sovereignty must give way to concerns of federal law enforcement, each has obscured and denigrated the merits of its position by specious

claims about the meaning of the eleventh amendment. Beyond this, there
is harm from distorting the eleventh amendment that is more difficult to
assess. Whenever courts engage in fictions,33 they diminish their institutional
stature and the authority of the law they make. This is true even for fictions
34
thought to be justified by higher necessity.
Second, preoccupation with the eleventh amendment sacrifices opportu-

nities to place important issues within a constitutional framework far more
capable of receiving them. Except in the rare cases it describes, the eleventh
amendment offers no help-certainly no authority-for determining how
much immunity from federal suit the Constitution confers on states. The
process for determining the appropriate amount will not be easy. 35 But at
least it should be possible from looking at other parts of the Constitution.

A.

The Unyielding Language of the Eleventh Amendment

Some provisions in the Constitution are so general as to invite extensive
interpretation. The Supreme Court has not always responded.3 6 It is ironic,
then, that the Court has long been inclined to read common sense and
broad-spectrum policy into eleventh amendment text so incapable of ab-

33. The classical definition of a legal fiction is "any assumption which conceals, or affects
to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration, its letter remaining unchanged,
its operation being modified." H.S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 25 (C. Haar rev. ed. 1963).
34. For examples of fictions probably supported by higher necessity, see infra note 56. We
shall see that higher necessity does not justify distortion of eleventh amendment text. See infra
notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
35. This is because misuse of the eleventh amendment further confuses an area-governmental immunity-already often difficult to sort out. Cf. Bowen v. Massachusetts, 108 S. Ct.
2722, 2741 (1988) (a case involving an issue of the sovereign immunity of the United States:
"The trouble with the sovereign immunity doctrine is that it interferes with consideration of
practical matters, and transforms everything into a play on words.").
36. For example, the ninth amendment states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain tights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. IX. The amendment was largely overlooked prior to Justice Goldberg's
concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965). There have been numerous
suggestions about what the ninth amendment might mean since then. See, e.g., Berger, The
Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1980); Franklin, The Ninth Amendment as Civil
Law Method and Its Implications ForRepublican Form of Government: Griswold v. Connecticut; South Carolina v. Katenbach, 40 Tut. L. REv. 487 (1966); Paust, Human Rights and
the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 CoRNELL L. REv. 231 (1975). Yet the
shape of rights conferred by the ninth amendment remains largely undefined by the Court.
See generally Note, The Ninth Amendment's Role in the Evolution of Fundamental Rights
Jurisprudence, 64 IND. L.J. 97 (1988).
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sorbing it. The amendment says only this: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." The manner
in which the eleventh amendment deals with state immunity may be arbitrary,37 but the text is no less clear for that. It does not protect states from
suit by their own citizens. It applies without reference to the remedy sought.
It restricts all of the judicial power, not merely that exercised under diversity
jurisdiction.
The most notorious distortion of the eleventh amendment came in Hans
v. Louisiana.39 There the Supreme Court held that federal courts were
without jurisdiction to entertain suits brought against unconsenting states
by their own citizens. The Court based its decision on the eleventh amendment, 4° but not its text. It appeared to rely instead on dissenting Justice
Iredell's article III analysis in Chisholm v. Georgia.41 The Hans Court
argued that it would be illogical to vary state immunity under the Constitution according to the plaintiffs' citizenship.4 2 Opposition to Hans is

37. That is, it is arbitrary if made to speak to broad state immunity concerns. In contrast,
the scope of the amendment conforms quite naturally to Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.)
419 (1793), and the atmosphere surrounding it. See supra note 11.
38. Some would dispute the suggestion that the text of the amendment is clear on the last
point. True, the description of parties plaintiff in the amendment to an extent seems to track
language in section 2 of article III creating federal diversity jurisdiction. Yet the language of
the eleventh amendment offers little to support a reading that fewer than all categories of
federal jurisdiction are affected. It limits "[t]he Judicial power of the United States." The
matter is discussed (and debated) at greater length elsewhere. Compare authorities cited infra
note 49 (arguing the diversity-only theory) with Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1372 (1989) and Massey, State
Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 61 (1989) (forthcoming).
39. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Hans was brought under the contract clause of the Constitution.
U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Louisiana legislature attempted to repudiate its obligations
on bonds held by a Louisiana plaintiff. The federal trial court applied the eleventh amendment
to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court affirmed. For discussion of the case and its historical
context, see C. JACOBS, supra note 8, at 109-10; J. ORsu, supra note 8, at 74-76; Gibbons,
supra note 3, at 1998-2001.
40. The Court noted that "on this question of the suability of the States by individuals,"
the eleventh amendment is "the highest authority of this country." 134 U.S. at 12.
41. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429-50 (1793). Hans's vague reference, 134 U.S. at 12, apparently
is to the concluding portion of Iredell's dissenting opinion in Chisholm where, after arguing
at length that the Judiciary Act did not support jurisdiction, he questioned whether such
jurisdiction was possible under the Constitution. He stated: "[M]y present opinion is strongly
against any construction of it, which will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit
against a State for the recovery of money." 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449. Yet it may go too far to
suggest, as some have, e.g., Collins, Book Review, 88 CoLuM. L. Rav. 212, 214 (1988), that
Hans is essentially an article III case. See supra note 40. On the significance of Hans's
allusions to article III, see infra note 60 and accompanying text.
42. Noting furor over Chisholm leading to the eleventh amendment, the Court asked:
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted, it was
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and has much to recommend it. The eleventh amendment has

neither residuary language nor imprecise categories. The amendment is about
as capable of a fixed meaning as language can make it. 44 It does not reach
45
citizen suits like Hans.
Hans set up the possibility that federal courts would be powerless to
enjoin state-based deprivations of federal rights. The Court avoided this by
creating another fiction. In Ex parte Young, 46 it held that the eleventh
amendment did not prevent federal courts from enjoining state officials
threatening to violate federal law. Since states could not authorize their
officials to violate federal law, the Court reasoned that they were not acting
on behalf of their states when they did. Thus, Young concluded, federal

injunctions under such circumstances left states unaffected. The Supreme
Court continues to adhere to this transparent distinction, 47 turning away
those seeking civil rights injunctions who commit the gaffe of suing states
4

by name.
An interpretation popular with those wishing to overrule Hans offers yet
another fiction, that the amendment should be understood to affect only

diversity jurisdiction. 49 This seems unnecessary to the case against Hans5

understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the
federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign
states, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the
Eleventh Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained
should prevent a State from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under
the Constitution or laws of the United States: can we imagine that it would have
been adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity
on its face.
134 U.S. at 15.
43. Four Justices (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens) wish to overrule the case.
See supra note 31. Many commentators support this course. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 4;
Gibbons, supra note 3; Shapiro, supra note 4.
44. Only under a deconstructionist view that "a text has no fixed, single meaning,"
Johnson, Decoding Deconstruction: A Whole New Style of Thinking, N.Y. Times, July 17,
1988, at E6, col. 2, is the scope of the eleventh amendment less than clear. On the emergence
of deconstruction as a mode of legal analysis, see generally Balkin, Deconstructive Practice
and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987); Hegland, Goodbye to Deconstruction, 58 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1203 (1985).
45. The Supreme Court pulled a second rabbit out of the hat when it read the amendment
to protect states from suit by foreign countries. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,
292 U.S. 313 (1934).
46. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
47. "There is no doubt that the reality is as [dissenting] Justice Harlan stated it, and that
everyone knew that the Court was engaging in fiction when it regarded the suit as one against
an individual named Young [the state attorney general] rather than against the state of
Minnesota." C. Wsuonr, Tim LAw oF FEDERAL COuRTS 289 (4th ed. 1983). Accord Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 114 n.25 (1984).
48. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
49. Some would certainly question portrayal of the diversity-only view as a fiction in the
making. See supra note 38. Many urging that Hans be overruled employ a diversity-only
argument. See, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941,
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and detracts from it. Prominent among the flaws in the diversity-only
argument" is the fact that it cannot be squared with the text. Whatever its

reach, the eleventh amendment constrains exercise of the federal judicial
power per se.5 2 Yet while the diversity-only fiction is an unnecessary price

to pay for overruling Hans, 5it3 may seem a small price for unseating other
eleventh amendment fictions.
Why has disrespect for the language of the eleventh amendment become

such a tradition? Perhaps it is because the extent of state subservience to
federal judicial power is a matter of transcendent political importance, and
the eleventh amendment is the only part of the Constitution that addresses
the subject explicitly. The amendment thus became a kind of lightning
rod-or a platform for developing constitutional law of state immunity full
way the countervailing concerns of
enough to accommodate in a 5rational
4
federal and state governments.
The importance of the state immunity questions may well suggest that

rules governing them should have the stature of constitutional law. 5 Thus,
if the eleventh amendment provided the only outlet for addressing these

2958-70 (1987) (Brennan J., dissenting) (Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., concurring in
dissent); Amar, supra note 5; Fletcher, supra note 4.
50. The alternative faithful to the text, simply to confine the eleventh amendment to all
noncitizen suits against states in federal court, would be little different in effect. Since the
eleventh amendment now derives its significance from the manner in which (via Hans) it keeps
plaintiffs from suing their own states, either reading of the amendment used to overrule Hans
would radically diminish the amendment's scope.
51. For a trenchant critique of the diversity-only argument, see Marshall, supra note 38.
52. That is to say, whether noncitizens attempt to sue states under diversity, federal
question, or admiralty jurisdiction, the eleventh amendment bars suit. Id. Hans's backers have
been quick to point this out. In their plurality opinion in Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2952, the Chief
Justice and Justices Powell, O'Connor, and White quote the eleventh amendment in observing:
"Federal question actions unquestionably are suits 'in law or equity'; thus the plain language
of the Amendment refutes [the diversity-oniy] argument."
53. In overruling Hans, the Court would renounce the most egregious of eleventh amendment fictions. It would also relegate the amendment to obscurity, creating little need for
federal courts to administer the state-versus-state-official fiction of Ex parte Young (explained
supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text).
The most serious flaw in the approach taken by those on the Court wishing to overrule
Hans is not the violence it does to the text of the eleventh amendment, but that it discounts
the possibility of constitutional support for state immunity beyond the eleventh amendment.
See infra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
54. See Field, supra note 4, at 1279 (noting that "distortions . . . have been imposed
upon the language of the eleventh amendment from the outset in order for it to support a
workable and appropriate sovereign immunity doctrine").
55. Some are unwilling to make this assumption. See, e.g., Field, supra note 4 (arguing
that, beyond the literal text of the eleventh amendment, rules determining state immunity in
federal court should be common law or statutory); Jackson, supra note 4 (arguing the use of
federal common law). Professor Jackson has taken the position that the Constitution offers
no help. She writes: "Despite the Court's repeated and often eloquent insistence that state
sovereign immunity is a principle fundamental to the Constitution, the doctrines of sovereign
immunity applied to claims against states in federal courts cannot be justified by exegesis of
any portion of the Constitution itself." Id. at 78.
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concerns, higher necessity 6 might have justified Supreme Court manipulation

of the amendment's text, whether to assure federal civil rights injunctions
or to recognize that federal suits by noncitizens and citizens alike diminish
state authority. What makes these distortions ultimately indefensible is that

other parts of the Constitution provide ample foundation for broad-spectrum
law and policy concerning state immunity.

B.

57
Solutions Elsewhere in the Constitution

It is worth remembering that the Supreme Court decided the first state
immunity case, Chisholm v. Georgia, within an article III framework."
Substantial and continuing discussion about the correctness of Chisholm59
proves that article III can provide an arena for state immunity issues.
Indeed, article III continued to exert some influence on the state immunity

question (albeit indirect) after ratification of the eleventh amendment. Apart
from stare decisis, it is fair to say that Hans's only legitimacy comes from
the Court's attempt there to draw support from article 111. 60

56. One example of higher necessity may be the Supreme Court's ruling in United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), that an intramural dispute within the executive branch was
nonetheless a justiciable controversy satisfying article III. The great importance of the result
in the case (production of the Watergate tapes) makes the justiciability ruling bearable; however,
difficult questions why or whether the Court really had authority to hear the case remain. See
generally Symposium on United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. Rv. 1 (1974) (contributions
by Berger, Gunther, Henkin, Karst & Horowitz, Kurland, Mishkin, Ratner, Van Alstyne). In
a different, nonconstitutional setting, the Court has in several cases read the Full Faith and
Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), to require state courts to honor federal judgments,
even though the language of the statute imposes no such obligation. While "[i]t would be
unthinkable to suggest that state courts should be free to disregard the judgments of federal
courts," C. WsuOmR, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4468,
at 648 (1981), the Supreme Court was forced to protect federal judgments through "strength
of arm and sleight of hand." Degnan, FederalizedRes Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741, 749 (1976).
57. How state immunity law can and should be recast under the Constitution is a matter
deserving more than the brief treatment it receives here. Yet such is the inability of the eleventh
amendment to underpin state immunity law in a forthright and inclusive way that this sketch
may demonstrate the superiority of other sources in the Constitution. Whether the best approach
for reforming current law lies in recasting constitutional doctrine is quite another question.
On that, this paper may provide food for thought. It does not, however, provide a definitive
response to the position taken by many (most recently in Professor Jackson's excellent article,
see Jackson, supra note 4) that the best approach lies through federal common law.
58. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 97.
59. See Easley, The Supreme Court and the Eleventh Amendment: Mourning the Lost
Opportunity to Synthesize Conflicting Precedents, 64 DER. U.L. Rnv. 485, 503-04 (1988). See
also sources cited supra note 8.
60. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. The Court continues to link Hans with
article III. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985); Pennhurst, 465
U.S. at 98.
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Article III takes cognizance of both of the concerns juxtaposed in the
state immunity debate. Of course, the nature and importance of federal

judicial power are central to article

111.61

Federalism concerns limiting article

III are less explicit, but no one doubts that article III doctrine has been
shaped in part by respect for state governments, particularly state courts. 62
Article III is complete in scope, authorizing all exercises of the federal

judicial power of courts within it.6A Breadth alone, then, would seem to
make article III superior to the eleventh amendment as an arena for
accommodating countervailing concerns of federal law enforcement and

state sovereignty. Yet the article is also inviting because of its ambiguity.
Thus, while article III's most prominent ambiguity surrounds the case-orcontroversy limitation on federal power, 64 it is also true that section 2 of
the article confers authority to hear cases without clearly protecting states

or clearly exposing them to suit 65-1eaving room for the Supreme Court to
conclude either way, or to strike a balance in between.
Other portions of the Constitution might supplement article III. The
supremacy clause would prevent immunization of states from federal suit

61. Thus Congress may not confer upon federal courts jurisdiction unprovided for under
article III, Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 491 (1983); Hodgson v.
Bowerback, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809). And it may not compromise the authority of article
III adjudications, Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 409 (1792), nor may state or local
governments, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
62. Many at the Constitutional Convention saw lower federal courts as an encroachment
on the authority of state courts. M. FARaAND, THE FRAi No OF THE CoNsTTToIN OF THE
UNITED STATEs 79-80 (1913). Delegate James Madison offered the language in article III
leaving actual creation of lower federal courts to Congress in order to blunt an initiative to
eliminate them altogether. I M. FA urm, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNv wnloN 21-22,
119, 125 (1937). Concerns of federalism figure prominently in the manner in which Congress
discharges its authority under article III to regulate the jurisdiction of lower federal courts.
See analysis and authorities appearing in Shreve, supra note 20, at 415-17. They influence the
manner in which the Supreme Court regards the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, see, e.g.,
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941), and the Supreme Court's
own jurisdiction to review state decisions, see, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
63. See supra notes 13 and 61. The prevailing assumption is "that the text of Article III
gives a clear direction that cases to which the federal judicial power extends must be tried, as
a matter of original jurisdiction, in a court constituted as an Article III court if it is to be
tried at all in a federal tribunal." See P. BATOR, D. MEL.TZER, P. MIsHnI & D. SEmu, o,
THE FEDERAL CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 470-71 (3d ed. 1988) (emphasis in original).
For a comparison of the role of article III courts and the more limited role of courts created
under article I, see Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article II1Courts, 56 U. CoLO. L. REv.
581 (1985).
64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This limitation materializes in ripeness, mootness, and some
standing doctrines (among others). See generally Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III:
Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy Requirement," 93 HA!v. L. REv. 297 (1979);
Sunstein, Standing and the Privatizationof PublicLaw, 88 CoLum. L. REv. 1432, 1474 (1988).
65. On the plausibility of opposing readings of article III on this issue in Chisholm, see
supra notes 8, 10 & 59 and accompanying text.
66. Read narrowly, the supremacy clause binds only state judges. But other provisions
of the Constitution, most notably the fourteenth amendment, directly constrain
the action of all state officials, often without regard to whether state courts have
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when to do so would be destructive to federal substantive law. The tenth
amendment 67 provides further authority, if such be needed, for protecting

state sovereign interests in federal litigation. 6s
It would not be the first time the Supreme Court recast law under a
different part of the Constitution.6 9 What makes the move attractive here
is that law suspect on the authority of the eleventh amendment seems to

rest easily within a framework designed around article III. And, without
suggesting that use of an article III-plus approach to state immunity would

replicate present law, at least the shift alone would not seem to give
significant advantage to either side. 70 To illustrate both of these points,

consider one possibility. The Supreme Court could draw from article III
and possibly the tenth amendment to declare states generally immune from

federal suit 7' but could reserve federal judicial power under the supremacy
72
clause to grant prospective relief.

ruled on the validity of officials' acts; moreover, article VI declares that "the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers
...of the several states [sic] shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support
this Constitution.U Accordingly, the Court has not limited to state judges its
demand for compliance with the federal Constitution.
L. Tnam, supra note 3, at 33 (citations omitted).
67. The tenth amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The moribund state of the tenth amendment under
current doctrine could make a fresh application more difficult. For a survey of recent decisions,
see Freilich, Connet & Walters, Federalism in Transition: The Emergence of New State and
Local Strategies in the Face of the Vanishing Tenth Amendment, 20 URa. LAw. 863, 866-69
(1988).
68. For a comparison of the tenth and eleventh amendments, see Brown, supra note 4.
One critic offers the tenth amendment as a foundation for a reformation of the constitutional
law of state immunity. See Massey, supra at 38.
69. For example, the Supreme Court once relied on the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to determine how information could be used to set death penalties in state court.
See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977). It has since substituted the eighth amendment
as its frame of reference. See Booth v. Maryland, 107 S.Ct. 2529 (1987). The shift seems to
stem less from a change in the character of the procedural rights of the accused (Booth cites
Gardner with approval) than from the judgment that eighth amendment analysis presents
opportunities to weigh procedural concerns arising in death penalty cases with greater clarity
and precision. See generally Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due
Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143 (1980).
70. Article III is more insulated from congressional authority than the eleventh amendment.
In theory, then, federal suitors might suffer if Congress lost the power to suspend state
immunity it now enjoys because immunity is based on the eleventh amendment. See supra
note 13. Had the Court made more serious use of its power in civil rights cases, the shift
would be more significant. But it has not. In Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), it refused
to read 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to suspend the eleventh amendment. See generally Note, Quern v.
Jordan: A Misdirected Bar to Section 1983 Suits Against States, 67 CAL F. L. REv. 407 (1979).
71. Presently, additions built on the eleventh amendment by Hans and Monaco, 292 U.S.
at 313. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
72. This would be comparable to the exception to the eleventh amendment created by Ex
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CONCLUSION

The eleventh amendment is a historical artifact. Its role in modem
constitutional law should be only slightly greater than article I's denial to
Congress of the authority to confer titles of nobility!3 The amendment
should exist only to block the rare case where a noncitizen attempts to sue
a state in federal court. To expect greater service from the amendment is
unrealistic and counterproductive. It sets up a false dilemma to suggest that
the Court must either force-feed policy and common sense into the language
of the eleventh amendment or be without a means of setting state immunity
standards under the Constitution. Acknowledgment of the eleventh amendment's insignificance would clear the way for serious thought about state
immunity elsewhere, notably under article III.
This paper takes no view on the amount of immunity from federal suit
states should enjoy. But letting go of the eleventh amendment would surely
improve the process leading to an answer. To send parties elsewhere in the
Constitution would put them in closer touch with countervailing policies of
federalism and federal law enforcement. It would permit an exchange of
views untroubled by charges and countercharges of illicit textual interpretation. Finally, it would reduce the amount of intellectual dishonesty in
American constitutional doctrine.

parte Young. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. The relationship between Young
and the supremacy clause is much like that between Hans and article III (on the latter, see
supra note 60 and accompanying text). Apart from stare decisis, the only legitimacy Young
has comes from the extent that it can be grounded on the supremacy clause. Cf. Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) ("Mhe availability of prospective relief of the sort awarded
in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause.").
73. Article I states, "No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States." U.S.
CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. It is clear that not every part of the Constitution must have

contemporary vitality.

